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ABSTRACT

We present a network architecture and accompanying algoril.hms for countering distributed denial-of-service (ODaS) atlacks directed at an Internet server. The basic mechanism is for
a server under stress 10 inslall a router throttle at selected upSlream routers. The throttle is the leaky-bucket rate at which a
router can forward packets destined for the server. Hence, before aggressive packets can converge to overwhelm the server,
participating rou tees proactively regulate the contributing packet
rates to more moderate levels, thus forstalling an impending atlack. In allocating the server capacity among the roulers, we
propose a notion of fevel-k max-minfaimess. Wc present simulation results using a realistic global network topology, and various models of good uscr and atlacker distributions and behaviors. Using a generator model of web requests parameterized by
empirical data, we also evaluate Ihe impact of throtUing in protecting user access to a web server. First, for aggressive attackers, the throttle mechanism is highly effective in preferentially
dropping atlaeker traffic over good user traffic. In particular,
level-k max-min fairness gives bener good-user protection than
recursive pushback of max-min fair ratc limits proposed in the
literature. Second, throlUing can regulate the experienced scrver
load to below its design limit - in Ihe presence of user dynamics - so that the server can remain operational during a DDoS
attack.

r.

INTRODUCTION

In a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack (e.g.,
[1], [2]), a cohort of malicious or compromised hosts (the
"zombies") coordinate to send a large volume of aggregate traffic lo a victim server. In such an episode, it is
likely that network nodes near the edge will progressivcly
become more vulnerable to resource overruns as their dislance from the server decreases. There are two reasons.
First, a node that is closer to the server will likely have
less service capacity because it is closer to the network
edge, and is designed lo handle fewer users. Second, such
a node will generally sec a larger fraction of the attack
traffic, which has gone through more aggregation inside
the network. In particular, the server system itself is highly
vulnerable, and can become totally incapacitaled under exlrcmc overload conditions.
Research supported in PlITt by CERIAS, and in part by the National
Science Foundation under grant numbers E1t\-9806741 and CCR9875742 (CAREER)
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We view DDoS attacks as a resource management problem. Our goal in this paper is to prolCCl a server system
from having to deal with excessive service request arrivals
over a global network. (However, the approach can be easily generallzed to prolCCting an intermediate routing point
under overload.) To do so, we adopt aproactive approach:
Before aggressive packets can converge to overwhelm a
server, we ask routers along forwarding paths to regulate
the contributing packetrales La more moderate levels, thus
forestalling an impending attack. The basic mechanism is
for a server under stress, say S, to inst.all a router throttle at an upstream router several hops away. The thrQ[tle limits the rate al which packets destined for S will be
forwarded by the router. To aecomodate bursly traffic, a
throltle should be implemented as a leaky bucket with the
desired rate limit and some bucket size s (in bits) to absorb
the burstiness. Traffic thal exceeds the rate limit can either
be dropped or rerouLcd lo an alternate server, although we
will focus exclusively on the dropping solution in this pa-

per.
A key element in the proposed defense system is to install appropriate throliling rates at the distributed routing
points, such that, globally, S exports its full service capacity Us to the network, bUl no more. The "appropriate" throltles should depend on the current demand distributions, and so must be negoliatcd dynamically between
server and nelwork. Our negotiation approach is serveri/litiated. A server operating below the designed load limit
needs no protection, and need not install any router throttles, As server load increases and crosses the designed load
limit Us. however, the server may start Lo prolCCt iLselfby
installing and activating a rate r throttle at a subset of its
upstream routers. After that, if the current-throttle fails to
bring down the load al S lo below Us, then the throttle
rate is reduced 1. On the other hand, if the server load falls
below a low-water mark Ls < Us. then the throttle rate is
increased (Le., relaxed). If an increase docs not-calL<;e the
load to significantly increase over some observation period, then the throttle is removed. The goal of the control
algorithm is to keep the server load within [L s , Us] whenever a throttle is in effect.
Since wattling requires only looking up the IP destination address of a packet, it has essentially the same processing complexity as standard IP forwarding, and should
lNotice that reducing the throttle nue increa5es the extent of throttling, because a mUlcr will more restrict traffic destined for S.
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II. SYSTEM MODEL

add little computational overhead at a deployment router.
The amount of state information a router has to k'eep per
throttle is a few bytes, for storing the destination IF address
and the leaky bucket specification. However, since the lOta! amount of state information needed at a router is lineae in the number of installed throttles, we cannot expect
the routers to maintain state about every Internet server.
However, the approach can be feasible as an on-demand
and selective protection mechanism. The premise is that
DDoS attacks arc the exception rather !.han the norm. At
any given time, we expect at most only a minor portion
of !he network to be under attack, while the majority remaining portion to be operating in "good health". Moreover, rogue attackers usually target "premium sites" with
heavy customer utilization, presumably lO cause maximal
user disruptions and to generate the most publicity. These
selected sites may then elect to protect themselves in the
proposed architecture, possibly by paying for the offered
services.

We begin by stating Convention I that simplifies our
presentation throughout !he rest of the paper. Then, we
go on to describe our system model.
Convention 1: All traffic rale and server load quantities
stated in this paper are in units of kb/s, unless otherwise
stated.
We model a network as a connected graph G = (V, E),
where V is the sel of nodes and E is the set of edges. All
leaf nodes are hosLS and thus can be a traffic source. An
inlernal node is a router; a rouler cannot generate traffic,
but can forward traffic received from its connected hosts
or peer routers. We denote by R the set of internal routing nodes. All roulees are assumed to be trusted. The
se[ of hosts, H = V - R, is partitioned into the set of
ordinary "good" users, H g , and the set of attackers H a .
E models the network links, which are assumed to be bidirectional. Since our goal is to investigate control against
server resoUIcc overload, each link is assumed 10 have infinile bandwidth. The assumption ean be relaxed if the
A. Our cotltributiotls
control algorithm is also deployed lO protect routers from
overload.
Our contributions in lhis paper are:
In our study, we designate a leaf node in V as the tar• We contribute to the fundamental understanding of
get server S. A good user sends packets to S at some rate
router throttling as a mechanism against DDoS attacks.
chosen
from the range [0, T gJ. An attacker sends packets to
• We present an adapllve throttle algorithm that can effectively protect a server from resource overload, and in- S at some rate chosen from the range [0, TaJ. In principle,
crease the ability of good user lraffic to arrive at the in- while T 9 can usually be set to a reasonable level according
to how users normally access the service at S (and we astended server.
Us), il is hard to prescribe constrainlS on the
• We show how max-min fairness can be achieved across sume T g
of
T
choice
a . In practice, it is reasonable to assume that
a potentially large number of flows, and the implication of
T a is significantly higher than T g • This is because if evcry
a notion of lelJel-k max-mill faimess on DDoS attacks.
• We study how throttling may impact real application per- aLtackcr sends at a rate comparable to a good user, !hen
formance. Specifically, we demonstrate via simulations an attacker must recruit or compromise a large number of
hosts to launch an attack with sufficient traffic volume.
the performance impact on an HITP web server.
When S is under altaek, il initiates the throttle defense
mechanism outlined in Section 1. (For case of presentaB. Paper organizatio1l
tion, we assume that an overloaded server is still capable
The balance of !he paper is organized as follows. in Sec- of initiating the defense actions. However, as discussed
tion II, we introduce our system model. In Section ill, we in Section VII, the assumption can be relaxed in practice.)
formally specify the algorithm for compuLing throttle rates The throlUe does not have to be deployed al every router in
and discuss an optimization technique of throttle pruning the nelwork. Instead, the deploymenl poinls are paramethal relieves portions of the network not under aliack of de- terized by a positive integer k and are given by R(k) ~ R.
ployment COSLS. After defining our solution approach, we Specifically, R(k) contains all the routers that are either k
compare it with related work in the literature, in Section hops away from S or less lhan k hops away from S but are
IV. Section V discusses performance memes 10 evaluate direcUy connected to a host.
Fig. I shows an example network topology. In the figthe effectiveness of the proposed solution. Diverse simulation results using a realistic nelwork lopology are reported ure, a square node represents a host, while a round node
in Section VI. In Section VII, we discuss several issues represents a router. The hosl on the far left is the larget
about the practical deployment of our solution. Section server S. The coulers in R(3) are shaded in the figure. Notice that the bottom-most couter in R(3) is only lwo hops
vm concludes.
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Fig. 1. Network topology illustrating R(3) deploymcnt points
of router LhrottIe, and offcred and Lhrottled rates. The target range of server load is set to be [18,22], and lhe aeLual
achieved load in Lhis example is 20.53.

Algorithm throttle
alast := -00;
while (1)
multicast eurrent rate-rs throttle La R(k);
monitor traffic arrival rate a for time window w;
if (a > Us) /* throttle not strong enough */
/* further restrict throttle rate */
rs := rs/2;
elif (a < Ls) /* throltle too strong */
if (a - alast < E)
remove rate throttle from R(k);
break;
else
/* try relaxing throttle by additive step */
alasl:= a;

rs :=rs+6;
fi;

else
away from S, but is included because it is directly connected to a hosL

break;
fi;
end while;

Ill. THROTfLE ALGORITHM

We fonnally specify in Fig. 2 the algorithm by which

S detennines the throlLle rale to be installed in R(k). In
!.he specification, rs is !.he current throttle rate to be used
by S. It is initialized to Us/i(k), where f(K) is either
some small constant, say 2, or an cslimate of the number of
throttle points typically nccdcd in R(k). We usc a conslant
additive step, 6, to ramp up rs if a throttle is in effcct and
the current server load is below Ls.
The throttle algoriLhm is to be invoked whenever ei!.her
(i) the current server load (measured as traffic arrival rate
to S) crosses Us. or Oi) a throllie is in effect and the current server load drops below L s . Each time it is called.,
it multiea..ts a rate-rs throttle to R(k). This will cause a
router in R(k) to regulate traffic destined for S to a leaky
bucket with rate rs. The algoriLhm may then continue in
the while loop that interatively adjusts rs to an appropriate value. Notice Lhat the additive increase/multiplicative
decrease iterative process aims to keep the server load in
[Ls, Us] whenever a throttle is in effect. Otherwise, if Lhe
server load is below Ls and Lhe next increase in Lhe throttle rate inereases Lhe server load by an insignificant amount
(i.e., by less Lhan E), we remove the throlllc. The monitoring window w should be sel to be somewhat larger Lhan Lhc
maximum round trip time between S and a roulcr in R(k).
In the example network shown in Fig. I. lel Lhe number above each host (excepl S) denote the eurrent rate at
which Lhe host sends traffic to S. Also, let Ls = 18 and
Us = 22. The lotal offered load lo S exceeds Us, and

Fig. 2. Throttle algorilhm specification.

hence the throttle algorithm will be invoked at S. When
the algorithm terminates, S detennines the throttle rate to
be 6.25, and installs Lhis ralc at each of the router in R(3).
In !.he figure, the number above a router indicates the arrival rate of traffic destined for S, and the nwnber in parenthesis below the router indicates the throttled rate at which
Lhe traffic is being forwarcd. As a result of Lhe throttling,
Lhe load at S will be limltcd at 20.53, which is Lhe swn of
the throttled rates. Notice that the throltled rate at a rouLer
in R(3) is the router's max-min fair share of the achieved
server load of 20.53.
Notice that similar lo TCP congestion control, each
throttle rate will lake in the worst case (depending on k)
one network round trip time to Lake effect Hence, Lhe
throttle algorithm can take multiple round tri ps to terminate. Because of this, it can be difficulL La achieve exact
max-min fairness in a highly dynamic network. The result
will be some degree of under-utilization of the server capacity. We believe that since throttling is to be deployed
under extreme conditions (e.g.• in Lhe face of a DDoS attack), it is acceptable for the defense mechanism to restore
the availability of a large fraction - if not the entirety - of
Lhc server capacily.
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Fig. 3. Introducing monitor rouLcrs between S and R(3) allows
lhroUle requests to be pruned closer 10 S, and avoids throUle
deployment in all of lhe R(3) routers.

A. 17lrottle pnmillg
With the basic throttle algorithm described lhus far,
R(k) can increase quickly with k, resulting in unnecessary deployment costs if most of these routers are not on
an attack path. The situation can be improved without affecting system performance if routers loeaLed between S
and R(k) can monitor the arrival rates of packets destined
for S from different upstream links. When under stress,
S sends a rate-r throttle to the directly connected routers.
On receiving the throttle, a router does not immediately
forward the lhrouIe upstream as in the basic algorithm.
Instead, it starts monitoring the forwarding rates for upstream traffic destined for S. If the rate from an incoming
link is less than r, the throttle message can be pruned for
that link. If the rate from a link is higher than r, then the
throttle message is forwarded Lo the upstream router conn~ted to the link. The upstream router similarly performs
the rate monitoring for its upstream links and makes the
d~ision 10 either prune or forward a received throttle.

Figure 3 illustrates throttle pruning for the example network topology previously given in Fig. 1. In the figure,
notice that throules arc avoided in three of the rouICrs in
R(3), because they are not on the path of any attacker. The
figure also shows the routers that have to perform monitoring in order to support the pruning decision. Although the
tolal number of monitoring and throttling routers in Fig.
3 exceeds the number of throttling routers in Fig. I, for
a large k in a large-scale network where attacks arc localized in a few regions, pruning will significantly reduce the
scope of router participation needed.

Probabilistic lP marking is advanced by Savage et al
[II] to identify attackers originating a denial-oF-service
attack, in spite of source address spoofing. The analysis in [lOJ confirms the remark in fIll that their form of
lP traceback may not be highly effective for distributed
DoS attacks. Subsequently, Song and Perrig [I2J improves
upon the inFonnation convergence rate that allows to reconstruct the attack graph (by eliminating false positives
when markers can be fragmented across packets), and reduces the time overhead in the reconstruction process itself, for DDoS attacks. These algorithms expose the true
attackers, which supposedly facilitates defense actions that
can then be taken to curtail an attack. However, the required defense mechanisms arc external to IP trackeback,
which in and of itself offers no active protectio/l for a victim server.
To actively defend against attacks, analysis of routing
information can enable a router to drop certain packeL<>
with spoofed source address, when such a packet arrives
from an upstream router inconsistent with the routing infonnation. The approach requires sophisticated and potentially expensive rouLing table analysis on a per-packet
basis. Also, it is not necessary for attackers to spoof addresses in order to launch an attack. The latter observation
also limits the effectiveness of ingress filtering approaches
[5].
A defense approach most similar to ours is proposed by
Mahajan et at {9]. They describe a general framework for
idenLiIying and controlling high bandwidth aggregates in
a network. As an example solution against DDoS attacks,
an aggregate can be defined based on destination IP address, as in our proposal. To protect good user traffic from
attacker traffic destined for the same victim server, they
study recursive pus/wack of max-min fair rate limits starting from the victim server to upstream routers. Similar
to level-k max-min fairness, pushback defines a global,
cross-router notion of max-min fairness. Unlike level-k
max-min fairness, the pushback mechanism always starts
the resource sharing dceision at the server, where good
user traffic may have aggregated to a large volume and thus
can be severely punished (see Section VI). Such aggregation of nonnal user traffic has been observed to occur in
practice [4J.
Architecturally, our control algorithm is more of an endlo-end approach initialed by the server, whereas the proposal in Mahajan ct al [9J is more of a hop-by~hop approach in which routers participate more heavily in the
control decisions. Hence, our routers have simplified responsibilities, when compared with {9J - they do not need
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to compute server-centric max-min fair allocations, and
are not required to generate and send back status messages
to the server.
The use of authentication mechanisms inside Lhe network will also help defend against DDoS aLtacks, e.g.
IPscc [7]. Recently, Gouda et al [6] propose a framework
for providing /zop integrity in computer networks. Efficient alogrithms [or authentication and key exchanges arc
important research questions in this class of solutions.
Lastly, our solution aims to achieve max-min fairness
across a potentially large number of flows. Scalable maxmin fair allocation in such a situation is studied in [3],
where the optimal sharing objective is relaxed to achieve
substantial reductions in overhead.

VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

To evaluate how the proposed throttle mechanism would
perform over a real network, we conducted simulations
using a global network topology reconstructed from real
traceroute data.
The traceroute data set is obtained
from the InterneL mapping project at AT&T2. Il contain.<;
709,310 distinct traceroute paths from a single source to
103,402 different destinations widely distributed over the
entire Internet. We use the single source as our target
server S, and randomly select 5000 traceroutc paths from
the original data sel for use in our simulations. The resulting graph has a total of 135,821 nodes, of which 3879 are
hosts. We assume, therefore, thaL out of all the hosts in the
total global network, these 3879 hosts access S, either as
an attacker or a good lL'ler.

V. PERFORMANCE METRICS

One basic performance measure is how well router
throttles inslalied by S can floor attackers in their attempt
to deny good users of the ability to obtain service from S.
It is clear that the defense mechanism cannot completely
neuLralize the effects of malicious traffic - in pan because
attackers are !hemselves entitled to a share of Us in our
model. Hence, good users must sec a degraded level of
performance, but hopefully are much less prone to aggressive attack flows than without network protection.
Apart from the basic performance measure, it is necessary to evaluate the deployment costs of the proposed defensc mechanism. Therefore, the following arc important
evaluation criteria that we adopt:
• The percentage of good user traffic that makes it La the
server. Since !he control algorithm ensures that the server
operates under its maximum designed load, the good user
requcsts that arrive should be adequately served.
• The number of rouLers involved in protecting S. Since
throttling is based on IP destination address, its processing cost is essentially the same as traditional IP forwarding, and should impose litLle additional load on a router.
However, because throttling clips forwarding rate to some
preset ceiling, it is less Lolerant to traffic variabilities than
best-effort transmissions. For example, nonnal traffic that
oceasionally exceeds the ceiling and cannot be absorbed
by the token bucket will get clipped, instead of being
served by opportunistic resource availabilites.
• Algorithm stability in response to changing user demands. In a real network, both good users and attackers
may change their behaviors over time. It is important to
evaluate how our control algorithm responds to such dynamics, in tenns of (i) how well server load can be kept
within [L S1 Us] during an auack, and (ii) how well good
users are protected from altadrers.

Evenly distributed aggressive altacker,\·
In our first set of experiments, we model aggressive atffiekers, whose average individual sending rate is several
times higher than that of nonnal users. Specifically, each
good user is chosen to send fixed Si7.e UDP packets to S,
where the packet interarrival times arc Polf>son and the average traffic· rate is randomly and unlfofnily &awn from
the range [0,2]. Each attacker is chosen to send tramc at a
rate randomly and uniformly drawn from the range [0, T a ],
where T a is either 10 or 20 according lO the particular experiment. Furthermore, we selecL attackers and good users
Lo be evenly distributed in the neLwork topolgy: each host
in the network is independently chosen to be an auacker
with probability p, and a good user with probability 1 - p.
Figure 4 compares the performance of our algorithm (labeled "level-k max-min fairness") with that of the pushback max-min fairness approach in [9], for T a = 20 and
p = 0.2. We show the percentage of remaining good user
and attacker traffic that passes the router throttles and 'arrives at the server. Figures 5 and 6 show the corresponding
results when T a = 20 and p
0.4, and T a
10 and
p = 0.4, respectively. We plot the average results over
ten independent experimental runs, and show the standard
deviation as an error bar around the average.
Notice from the figures that genemlly, level-k max-min
fairness gives signifcantly better protection for good user
traffic than pushback max-min fairness. The performance
advantage of level~k max-min fairness increases as k increases, unLil it levels off at k roughly equal La 20. This
is because good traffic can aggregate to a significanL level
ncar S (the increase rate can be exponential), making it
hard 10 distinguish from the attacker traffic at that location. Since pushback always originates control at S, it
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can severely punish good traffic. By initiating conlral further away from S (specifically, about k hops away), level-k
rnax~min fairness achieves better good user protection.

Unevenly distributed aggressive attackers
In this set of experiments, each good user lraffic rate
is chosen randomly and uniformly from the range [0,2],
while each attacker rate is similarly chosen from the range
[0,20]. In each experiment, about 20% of the hosts arc
chosen to be auackers, and the remaining hosts to be good
users.
In these experiments, we select the attackers to have different concentration properties. Specifically, we pick five
disjoint subtrees from the network topology, labeled in Fig.
7 as 1-5. The five sublrees have properties as shown in Table L We then define four concenlration configurations,
0-3, for !.he attackers, as shown in Table II. The imenLion

Fig. 7. Subtrees 1-5 used in aUaekerconcenLration experiments.

is for attacker concentration to increase as we go from configurations 0 Lo 3. (Notice that the roots of subtrees 4 and 5
in configuration 3 share a common parent, and so attacker
traffic converges more quickly than the sublrCCS I and 3 in
configuration 2.)
Fig. 8 shows the percentage of remaining good traffic for the four concenlrations, using level-k max-min fairness. Fig. 9 shows the corresponding results for pushback
max-min fairness. Notice that as k increases, level-k maxmin fairness achieves good protection for the good users
in all four configurations. For configurations 1-3, howSubtree
1
2
3
4
5

No. of nodes

No. ofhosls

1712
1126
1455
1723
1533

459
476

448

Root's distance
from S (hops)
4
6
7

490
422

8
8

TABLE I
PROPERTIES OF SUBTREES 1-5.
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Configuration

0
1
2
3

Attackers uniformly chosen from
entire graph
all the five subtrees
subtrees 1 and 3
subtrees 4 and 5
TABLEll

CONRGURED CONCENTRATIONS Of' ATIACKERS.
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Fig. 9. Protection for good users, under four different attacker
concentrations, using pushbaek max-min fairness.

i

f

,. f-~----~---::-::::.-::_:·:·:·:·:· :·-l
~--~-,,-

•
•

•

. . . _"'Ph.

.~.--;---,~.--,~.----c.:;_-~.:;_-~.:;_---i,.

Fig. 8. Protection for good users, under four different attacker
concentrations, using Icvcl-k max-min fairness.

ever, notice a "dip" in the achieved protection over k values between about 6 to 11. For example, the percentage of
remaining good traffic for configuration 3 decreases from
k = 9 to k = 11, and rises again afterwards.
To explain the dip, consider lhe case when all auaekers are conlained in olle subgraph, say G', whose root is
m hops away from S. For the traffic seen at R(k), as k
decreases from m lo I, there will be more and more aggregation of good user traffic but 110 jllr/her aggregation
oj attack traffic. This will cause a larger fraction of good
user traffic to be dropped (its volwne is more comparable
to attack traffic) as throttling is performed with a smaller
k, for k E [1, m]. This explains the initial rising curves
in Fig. 8 before the dip. For k a few hops larger than
m, the aggregation situation for both good user and attack
traffic is similar to the case of evenly distributed attackers. Hence, wc observe increased proLcction for good user
traffie as k increases from m + c onwards, where c is a
small constant. This explains the rising curves shortly after the dip. At lhe point when kjllst increases past thc root
of G' , however, there is progressively less aggregation of
attaek traffic. This may cause reduced dropping rate for
the attack traffic (since its volume at the control points is
smaller and more comparable to good user traffic), when
compared with control after full attack traffic aggregation
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Fig. 10. Comparions of good-user prolCction between level-k
and pushback max-min fairness - for configurations 0 and
3 only.
has occurred at lhc root of G1• This explains the dip itself.
Despite the above "anomaly",levc1-k max-min fairness
consislently and signifeantly outperforms pushback maxmin fairness for k > 15. The performance advanlage decreases from 0-3, because pushback max-min fairness becomes more effective as attackers get more concentrated.
Figure 10 more clearly compares the two approaches by
plotting their results together, for configurations 0 and 3.
Evenly distributed "meek" attackers
Our results so far asswne that altackers are significantly
more aggressive than good users. This may be a reasonable
asswnption in practice. However, should a :i:rialicious entity be able to recruit or compromise ma,ry hosts to launch
an auack (which clearly requires a much more powerful
attacking entity), then each of these hosts behaving like a
normal user can sLill together bring about denial of serviee.
It is inherently more difficult to deferid against such an
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Fig. I I. Protection for good user traffic under evenly-distributed
"meek" attackers. for bom Icvel-k and pushback max-min

fairness.
auack. In an experiment, we model both attackers and
good users La send traffic to S at a calc randomly and uniformly drawn from [0,2]. We randomly pick about 30%
Of 1169 of the hosts to be attackers, which are evenly dislIibulCd over the network. The remaining hosts arc laken
as good users. This produces an aggregate traffic rate of
3885, which is about 39% higher than the server capacity
of 2800 that we model.

The percentages of remaining good user and attacker
traffic that arrives at S are shown in Figure 11, for bo~
lcvel-k and pushback max-min fairness. As shown in the
figure, both approaches essentially fail to distinguish between the good users and the attackers, and pWlish both
classes of hosts equally. However, llze throttling mech-

anism, whether it employs level-k or pushback max-min
Jaimess. call still be useful because it does protect the
server Jrom overload. Hence, the 70% of good user requests that do make it to S may still be able to obtain service from S, whereas the same may not be true of a server
that is simply overwhelmed with excessive packet arrivals.
DeploymerU extellt
The previous two sets of experiments suggest that, for
aggressive attackcrs, the effectiveness of level-k max-min
fairness increases with k. At the same time, however, the
cost of deployment may also increase, as the number of
routers in R(k) becomes larger.
Figure 12 plots the percentage of routers involved in
throttling as a function of k, for both lcvel-k and pushback max-min fairness. (For the levcl-k approach, we
count bolh monitoring and throttling routers.) Notice that
the two approaches basically require a comparable number
of deployment points, although for k equal to 4-9, pushback max-min fairness is somewhat more efficient, and for

Fig. 12. Number of participating routers for Ievel-k and pushback max-min fairness, as a function of the deployment
depth.
larger k, level-k max-min fairness is somewhat more efficient. Also, the percentage of deployment poinl<; levels off
as k rises above 20 for both approaches. This is because
as k increases, a throttling node will likely see a progressively smaller rate of traffic destined for S. If the rate is
small enough, both algorithms avoid Ihc use of a throttle;
hence, the number of deployment points is not increased.
Hence, the throttling mechanism does /lot have to be globally deployed to be effective.

Dynamic users
Next, we investigate the effects of user dynamics (for
both good users and attackers) on our control algorithm.
For this experiment, we use k = 15, Ls = 4700 and
Us = 5300. 1\venty percent of the hosts are chosen lO
be attackers, and the rest are good users. The attackers
are evenly distributed over the experimental network. We
measure time in units of maximum round trip delay between S and a router in R(15).
As attackcrs and good users vary their sending rates, we
capture the dynamics of the control algorithm. The results
are shown in Fig. 13. In the figure, we plot over time (i) the
aggregate rate at which traffic is sent by all the hosts, (ii)
the rate at which all traffic arrives at S, (ill) the aggregate
ralc at which traffic is scm by alllhe good users, and (iv)
the rate at which good user !raffle arrives at S. By comparing (ii) against L s and Us - which arc also shown in the
figure - we can evaluate the effcctlvcncss of our algorithm
in protecting S from resource overload. By comparing (iii)
and (iv), we can get an idea of how well good user traffic
is protccLed from attacker traffic. Fig. 14 shows how the
throttle ratc TS evolves over time.
We now explairi the network dynamics lhat produce Fig.
13 and Fig. 14. At t = 0, each good user sends al a
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Fig. 13. Algorilhm dynamics in response to changing anacker
and good user behaviors over time.
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Fig. 14. Evolution of throttle rate rs over time.

rate randomly chosen from [0,2). and no throttle is in cfw

feet. hnmediately afterwards, the attack slarts wHh each
attacker sending at a rate randomly chosen from [0,20].

The lhroLLlc algorithm is invoked with TS initialized to 128.
At t = 1, tbe lhrottle takes effect but fails (a bring down
the server load to below L s . The throttle rate is then halved
to 64, and the throUlc algorilhm continues. At t = 7. after
five I.hrattle rate reductions and one increase, the throttle
algoril.hm tenninates with rate 4729.
During time interval [7,10], the attacker and good user

traffic rates keep changing, but arc kept in the original
ranges of [0,20] and [0,2]. respectively. At t = 9, the
server load increases slightly above Us, which causes the
throttle algorithm to run with a single iteration and return
4710 as the LhrouIe rale.
At t = 10, half of the attackers stop sending any traffic.
This causes the server load to drop below L s at t = II.
The throtl1e algorithm ramps up the throtl1e rate, and at
t = 14, returns with rs = 4843. (During time [10, 15), the
good users and attackers keep changing their rates, though

,I

0
0

•

'"

..

•

II

"

Fig. 15. Number of message-hops required for each Ihrottle action taken by S. Notice that from an individual link's perspective. the overhead of each lhroLtle is at most one control
message. Hence, the per-link additional load due 10 throtWng is very small.
using the same distributions of rate.) At t = 15, the half of
the attackers that stopped resume sending, each with rate
chosen from [0,20]. The throttle algorithm then runs with
two iterations, and determines rs to be 4718. At t = 18,
the attackers reduce their traffic rate by 50%, with each
sending at a rate chosen from [0, 10]. The resulting server
load at t = 19 remains in [Ls, Us]' and SO no control action is taken. Meanwhile, at t = 19, half of the remaining
attackers stop sending. This causes the server load to drop
below L s at t = 20, and the throttle algorithm to run with
two iterations, and returns rs = 4736.
At t = 22, the DDoS attack stops completely. The
throttle algorithm increases the throttle rate at t = 23 and
t = 24. At t = 25, thc throtl1e is removed because the last
throttle rate increase did not result in significant increase
in thc scrver load.
Each throttle message is multicast from S to R(S).
Hence, cach throttle will produce a load of only one packet
on each network link, which is a very small practical overhead. It is also interesting, however, to measure the number of message-hops required by each throttle (I.e., if a
message traverses x links, the number of message-hops is
x). This perfonnance measure is shown in Fig. 15. Notice
that in general, a large throttle rate requires a small number
of message hops, because the message can be pruned early
in the distribution tree.

Web server performa"ce
To evaluate the impact of throtLling on real user applications, we simulate the performance of a web server under
DDoS attack. The simulations are performed using ns2,
and clients access the web server via HTTP 1.0 over TCP
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RenolIP. (Yep is interesting because the achieved through=
put by a client also depends on the rate at which acks
are returned from lhe server to the client.) The simulated
network is a subset of the AT&T traccroule topology described above. It eonsists of 85 hosts, of which 20% (i.e.,
17 out of 85) arc chosen as attackers. The maximum and
average numbers of hops between a client and lhe server is
\f-,
!
30 and 15, respectively.
!
'.1-,
Attackers generate UDP traffie destined for the server, at
a constant rate of 6000 bits/so Web clients make requests
for documents to the server, where lhe document sizes and
times between requests are probabilistically generated according to collected empirical distributions.] If a request
arrives at the server successfully, the server will return the Fig. 16. Pial of (i) original client request rate, (ii) rate of
requested document after a random processing time, also
successfully processed client requests with 1eve1-10 router
chosen according to collected empirical distributions.
throttling, and (iii) rate of successfully processed client requests
without throtlling, over time.
We model the web server to have Ls = 8 kbytcs/s
and Us = 10 kbytcs/s. We report two experiments with
k = 10 and k = 9, respectively. To compare web server
performance with and without throttling, we plot the rates
of client requests lhat are succes~fully processed by the
server in both cases, over lime. The aggregate rate at which
the elients originally make requests is also shown for baseline comparison. Each experiment runs for 100 seconds of
simulated time, and an auack starts at time 10 seconds.
Fig. 16 shows the results for k = 10. Notice that with
throltling, lhe rate of client requests that are successfully
processed is much closer to the original client request rate,
than without throtlling (lhe averages are 3.8, 2.5 and 0.9
kbytesls, respectivciy). Fig. 17 shows the corresponding
results for k = g, and supports !.he same conclusions. Fig.
18 shows the web client, attacker, and total traffic arrival Fig. 17. Plot of (i) original c1ienl request rale, (ii) rate of successfully processed client requests with level-9 rouler throtrate at the server, for k = 10. Notice that our throttle netling, and (iii) rate of successfully processed clientrequesL~
gotiation algorii.hm is effective in keeping the actual server
without throttling, over lime.
load between L s and Us.

I-
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VII. DISCUSSIONS

Several observations are in order about the practical
deployment of our defense mechanism. First, we must
achieve reliability in installing router throttles. Otherwise,
the throttle mechanism ean itself be a point for attack. To
ensure reliability, throttle messages must be authenticated
before an edge router (assumed to be truSled) admits them
into the network. Notice that only edge routers that have
made arrangement with lhe (relatively few) server sites
that desire protection have to do authentication. Other
edge routers can just drop throttle requests unconditionally. Also, throLLle requests must be efficienUy and reli3Pleasc sec htlp:/IhUp.cs.berkeley.edullomhlwwwlrdffic.hlml for furIher delails.

Fig. 18. Plol of tOlal, atlacker, and web client traffic arrival rates
at server, over lime, for level-lO throttling.
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ably delivered from source La destination, which can be
achieved by high network priority for throttle messages
and retransmissions in case of loss. Since throttle mes~
sages are infrequent and low in volume, the cost of authentication and priority transmissions should be acceptable (notice that edge authentication will prevent the nct~
work from seeing a high load of phony throttle messages).
Second., because of the feedback nature of the control
strategy, it is possible that the server will transiently experience resource overload. To ensure that the throttle mechanism remains operational during these times, we can either use a coprocessor on the server machine that is not
concerned with receive-side network processing, or deploy
a helper machine, whose job is Lo periodically ping the
server, and initiate defense actions when the server is not
responsive.
Third, the throttle mechanism may not be universally
supported in a network. Our solution remains applicable
provided at least onc router supports the mechanism on a
network path that sees substantial aLl..acker traffic. Depending on the position of such a router, the feasible range of k
may be more restricted.
Fourth, we have adopted a generic notion of max-min
fairness in our study, which makes it easy to manage and
deploy. As observed in [91, however, it is also possible to
have a policy-based definition of max-min fairness in practice. The policy can refer to different conditions in different network regions, in tenos of tariff payments, network
size, susceptibility to security loopholes, etc.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented a servcr~centric approach to protecting a
server system under DDoS attacks. The approach limits
the rate aL which an upstream rouLcr can forward packets
to the server, so that the server exposes no more than its
designed capacity to the global network. In allocating lhc
server capacity among the upstream routers, we studied a
notion of level-k max-min fairness, which is policy-free
and hence easy to deploy and manage.
We evaluated algorithm effectiveness using a realistic
global network topology, and various models for attacker
and good user distributions and behaviors. Our results indicaLC lhat the proposed approach can offer significanL relief to a server that is being flooded with malicious attacker
traffic. First, for aggressive attackers, the throttle mechanism can preferentially drop attacker traffic over good user
traffic, so that a larger fraction of good uscr Lraffic can
make it to the server as compared with no network protection. In particular, level-k max-min fairness performs
better than recursive pushbaek of max-min fair rate limits
previously proposed in the literature [9]. This is -especi-

cally the case when auackers are evenly distributed over
the network. Second., for both aggressive and "in-eek" attackers, throttling can regulate the experienced serVer load
to below its design limit, so that thc server can remain operational during a DDoS attack.
Our results indicate- that "server-centric router throttling
is a promising approach to countering DDoS attacks.
However, modeling the behaviors of attackers is inherently
difficull, and modeling the behaviors of good users needs
to be service and environment specific. Hence, more study
is needed to evaluate Lhe robustness of the approach in
more diversc deployment scenarios. Also, our focus has
been on DDoS attacks in which attackers try fo overwhelm
a victim server by directing an excc..'lsive volume of traffic
to lhe server. Other forms cif attacks are possible thaI dO
not depend on the sheer volume of attack traffic 18]. However, more sophisticated attack analysis (e.g., intrusion detection) is usually feasible to deal with these other forms
ofauacks.
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